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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PERMITS PRAYER ROOM
IN STATE CAPITOL BUILDING
Van Zandt v. Thompson, 839 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1988)
In Van Zandt v. Thompson,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit rejected an establishment clause2 challenge to an Illi-
nois House resolution3 authorizing a prayer room in the state capitol
building.
The Illinois House of Representatives adopted a resolution providing
for the conversion of a hearing room in the state capitol to a room re-
served for prayer.' Plaintiffs5 filed suit in district court challenging the
endorsement, establishment, and maintenance of a prayer room in the
capitol as a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment
of the United States Constitution.6
The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.7
The district court found the resolution unconstitutional under the first
1. 839 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1988).
2. The establishment clause of the first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. The text of House Resolution 408 provides in part:
RESOLVED, BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EIGHTY-FOURTH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, that the Legislative Space Needs Com-
mission is hereby authorized and directed to make available a room with facilities for prayer and
meditation, primarily for the use of the members of the General Assembly, and the Commission
shall arrange for the maintenance of the prayer room; and be it further RESOLVED, The Speaker of
the House in conjunction with the House Minority Leader, shall arrange for the design and equip-
ment of the prayer room and for the raising of private donations to fund the operations and mainte-
nance of the prayer room ....
H.R. 408, quoted in Van Zandt, 839 F.2d at 1226.
4. 839 F.2d at 1216.
5. Van Zandt filed suit as an individual taxpayer. The Freedom From Religion Foundation,
Inc. filed as a representative of its members who are Illinois taxpayers. The district court found both
Van Zandt and the Foundation had standing to sue because the proposed prayer room would argua-
bly place economic burdens on the State of Illinois and its taxpayers. Van Zandt v. Thompson, 649
F. Supp 583, 587 (N.D. Il. 1986) (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 n.4 (1983)). Plain-
tiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
6. The first amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Plaintiffs also sought relief under article I, § 3 of the Illinois Constitution. The district court
treated Illinois' constitutional prohibition on the establishment of religion as identical to the estab-
lishment clause prohibition under the United States Constitution. Van Zandt v. Thompson, 649 F.
Supp. 503, 588 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (citing People ex. rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 56 Ill. 2d 1, 3-4, 305
N.E.2d 129, 130 (1973)).
7. Van Zandt, 839 F.2d at 1216.
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and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and article
I, § 3 of the Illinois Constitution.' On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and held: the House resolution
authorizing a prayer room in the state capitol does not violate the estab-
lishment clause.9
The Framers of the Constitution designed the religion clauses of the
first amendment to promote principles of separation' and neutrality"
between church and state.12 In Walz v. Tax Commission, 3 the Supreme
Court found that the Framers intended to afford protection against three
main evils: government sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement in religious activity.14 These prohibitions do not, however,
mean that the Court never allows government involvement in religious
activity. 15
A year after the Walz decision, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 6 the Court
enunciated a three-prong test to determine whether a violation of the
establishment clause exists. In Lemon, the Court struck down two state
statutes 7 which provided for state aid to church-related schools and sec-
8. 839 F.2d at 1217. The district court entered a declaratory judgement invalidating H.R. 408
and a permanent injunction prohibiting any actions to establish a prayer room in the capitol. Van
Zandt v. Thompson, 649 F. Supp. 583, 594-96 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
9. Van Zandt v. Thompson, 839 F.2d 1215, 1220 (7th Cir. 1988).
10. Thomas Jefferson advocated this concept of separation. "In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
church and State.'" Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). See also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122-23,
(1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42, (1980); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
214-25, (1962).
11. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (first amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion).
12. Eg., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) ("established principle that the government
must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion"). But see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-107,
113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (history of establishment clause shows that "nothing in the establish-
ment clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion").
13. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
14. Id. at 668.
15. In Wa/z itself the Court upheld state property tax exemptions for religious organizations.
Id. at 665. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upheld display of nativity scene on
public property), infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
(upheld state-employed chaplain for legislature), infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
17. Lemon and its companion case, Early v. DiCenso, combined challenges to similar Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania statutes. The Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act funded secular educa-
tion in non-public schools when the average per pupil expenditure on secular education in those
schools was less than the average in the state's public schools during a specified period. Id. at 607;
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ular teachers. The Supreme Court posed three criteria to determine if a
statute violates the establishment clause. 18  First, the legislature must
have adopted the law with a "secular legislative purpose." Second, the
statute's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion." Third, the statute must not result in "excessive
government entanglement with religion." 19
In Lynch v. Donnelly,2" the Court further clarified the role of the
Lemon test in establishment clause challenges. The Court rebuffed an
establishment clause challenge to a crebhe placed on public property.
The Court rejected an "absolutist"21 approach to Lemon,22 and instead
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-15-1 - 16-15-16 (Supp. 1970). The Pennsylvania Elementary and Secondary
Education Act authorized the state Superintendent of Public Instruction to "purchase" specified
"secular educational series" from non-public schools. PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (Pur-
don 1971). The state legislature concluded that the state's educational goals could appropriately be
fulfilled by government support of "those purely secular educational objectives achieved through
non-public schools." 403 U.S. at 609.
18. 403 U.S. at 612-13. For an excellent analysis of the three prongs of the Lemon test, see
Lieder, Religious Pluralism and Education in Historical Perspective: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 813 (1987). Lieder argues
that the Court fashioned the Lemon test from two competing conceptions of neutrality: that govern-
ment should remain separate from religion and religious institutions and that government should
treat religious and similarly situated non-religious institutions or activities equally. Id. at 824-30.
Lieder also argues, however, that political pluralism protects religious groups sufficiently so that the
Court may relax its scrutiny. Id.
For criticism of the Lemon test, see Choper, Church, State and the Supreme Court: Current Con-
troversy, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 551 (1987); Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95
YALE L. J. 1231 (1986).
19. In applying the test to the challenged statutes, the Court found both passed the first two
criteria. The legislatures had a secular purpose of enhancing the quality of secular education. The
effect of the statutes neither advanced nor prohibited religion because secular and religious education
are identifiable and separable. 403 U.S. at 613. Both statutes, however, failed to pass the third prong
of the test. In invalidating the statutes, the Court examined the character and purpose of the institu-
tions that were benefited, the nature of the aid the state provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and religious authorities. The Supreme Court concluded that the cumula-
tive impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each state involved excessive entan-
glement between government and religion. Id. at 614.
The Court's use of the entanglement prong to strike down an otherwise valid statute is ironic. The
entanglement test originally arose in Walz as an exception to the other two prongs - one that saved
an otherwise invalid statute. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970).
20. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
21. Id. at 678. The Court defined an "absolutist" approach as "mechanically invalidating all
governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in gen-
eral or to one faith." Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated that "[i]n our modern,
complex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity
and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic
and has been uniformly rejected by the Court." Id.
22. The Supreme Court elsewhere has indicated that courts should employ the Lemon criteria
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:283
scrutinized the challenged conduct to determine "whether in reality, it
establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."'2 3 As exam-
ples, the Court listed numerous illustrations of government acknowledge-
ment of the American religious heritage that do not, in reality, establish
religion.24
The Court has varied from case to case in the rigor with which it ap-
plies the Lemon test.25 In Marsh v. Chambers,26 the Supreme Court de-
parted entirely from the Lemon analysis.2 7 In Marsh, the Court
approved a state legislature's practice of opening each session with a
prayer read by a state-employed chaplain.2" The Court utilized an his-
simply as a guide and not as a strict formula. Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (no single
test or criteria in the establishment clause area); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (Lemon
test is merely a helpful signpost); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) (Lemon criteria do not
set "precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)
(use as a constitutional guidepost).
23. Although the Court did not rely exclusively on the Lemon test, it did apply it, and found a
crkehe displayed in a city park during the Christmas season passed the three criteria. Celebrating
the Holiday and depicting the origins of that Holiday are legitimate secular purposes. 465 U.S. at
681. The city did not endorse religion by including the creche. Finally, it created no administrative
entanglement because "the display requires far less ongoing, day-to-day interaction between the
church and state than religious paintings in public galleries." Id. at 684. Although the Court ap-
plied the Lemon test, the dissent argued that the court's application of the test was "less-than-vigor-
ous." Id. at 696. Certainly, even as the majority applied the test, it stated its "unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id. at 679.
24. 465 U.S. at 677. Much of this analysis supports the Seventh Circuit's decision in Van
Zandt. Illinois House Resolution 408 referred to a number of Lynch's historical examples. The
Lynch Court specifically noted that Congress has long provided chapels in the Capitol for religious
worship and meditation. Id. at 678. The Lynch court also quoted from Justice Douglas' famous
dictum, "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id. at 675
(quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
One scholar characterizes the Court's reasoning in Lynch as an "any more test," under whose
terms government sponsorship of a religion is unobjectionable if it is no more than what the govern-
ment has done in the past. Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall - A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 783.
25. See Choper, Church, State, and the Supreme Court: Current Controversy, 29 ARIz. L. REV.
551 (1987). Choper notes that "the area of government acknowledgement of religion best illustrates
the Supreme Court ignoring its own doctrine, the subject of religion in the public schools best illus-
trates the Supreme Court adhering to its own doctrine." Id. at 554. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently applied the Lemon test in establishment clause challenges affecting secondary and elementary
school children. For example, in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), the Supreme Court declared
a state law which required the posting of a copy of the ten commandments on public classroom walls
unconstitutional because it failed the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 41.
26. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
27. See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (Court did not find the Lemon test useful
when there is substantial evidence of overt discrimination against a religious group).
28. 463 U.S. at 791. The Supreme Court opined that the legislative prayer presents no more
potential for establishment than the provision of school transportation to a private religious school,
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torical analysis2 9 to reject an establishment clause challenge to this prac-
tice.3" The Court found that the United States Congress had followed
practices similar to those challenged in the state legislature at the time
Congress drafted the first amendment.31 Based on the deeply imbedded
history and tradition of opening legislative sessions with prayer, the
Court concluded that the Framers of the first amendment did not view
paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as an "establishment of
religion." 2
In Van Zandt v. Thompson,33 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that establishing and maintaining a prayer room in a state
legislative building does not violate the establishment clause.3 4 The court
offered two independent justifications for its decision, one based on
Marsh and one on Lemon.35
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), beneficial grants for higher education at religious
institutions, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), or tax exemptions for religious organiza-
tions, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1979). Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791.
For additional cases upholding opening legislative and public meetings with prayer, see Bogen v.
Doty, 598 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1979) (opening of county board meetings with prayer by unpaid
clergy); Lincoln v. Page, 109 N.H. 30, 241 A.2d 799 (1968) (opening of town meeting with prayer by
unpaid clergy); Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 378 Mass. 550, 392 N.E.2d 1195 (1979) (open-
ing of legislative session with prayer by paid clergy).
29. Similarly, in Walz the Court refused "to construe the Religion Clauses with a literalness
that would undermine that ultimate constitutional objective as illuminated by history." Walz, 397
U.S. at 671.
30. One scholar, Yehuda Mirsky, believes that in Marsh and Lynch the Supreme Court's de
facto exception to traditional establishment clause doctrine effectively allows government to ac-
knowledge religion formally and publicly without somehow endorsing it. Mirsky argues this doctri-
nal development is flawed in two respects. First, it is based on a misperception of the nature and
origins of American public religion. Second, it creates as many constitutional problems as it pur-
ports to solve. Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237 (1986).
31. The first United States Congress adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to open each
session with prayer. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788. The practice had a similar long tradition in the States'
history. The Nebraska legislature had opened legislative sessions with prayer even before attaining
statehood. Jour of Council, General Assembly 1st Sess. 16 (Jan. 22, 1855); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
32. 463 U.S. at 786.
33. 839 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1988).
34. Id. at 1220.
35. In dictum, the court also justified the prayer room as an "accommodation of religion." The
court suggested that the prayer room is a necessary or desirable aid to individuals who wish to
indulge their right to the free exercise of religion. Id. at 1223-224. Commentators have delineated
two distinct meanings of the term "accommodation." Accommodation refers either to a measure
that would violate the establishment clause if it were not compelled by the free exercise clause or to a
measure that, while not compelled by free exercise, promotes free exercise values in ways that make
it more acceptable under the establishment clause. See, eg., McConnell, Accommodation of Reli-
gion, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 4.
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The court's first rationale is based on the historical principles espoused
in Marsh, which the court argued is specially tailored to - perhaps even
controlling for - legislatures' internal practices.3 6 First, the court con-
ceded that a prayer room does not have the long history of tradition as
do opening prayers.3 7 The Van Zandt court, however, relied on the
broader tradition of legislative acknowledgement of the modest and
nonintrusive role for spiritual values in their work.38 The court reasoned
that if legislators may collectively bow their heads while a clergyman
opens a session with prayer, it is absurd to fault the designation of a room
in which legislators may pray or meditate privately. 9
Although the Seventh Circuit effectively decided the case applying
Marsh's special jurisprudence for legislatures,4° the court, in the alterna-
tive, applied Lemon.41 The court found that even if the Lemon test ap-
plies to these legislative arrangements, the practice satisfies those
criteria.42
First, the court found the requisite secular purpose. The court based
its conclusion on the repeated references to "meditation" and the sugges-
tion that legislators may legislate more effectively after spending time in
quiet solitude.43 Second, the Resolution did not have the primary effect
of advancing religion in general nor any one sect in particular. The court
found that where a body opens its daily sessions with public prayer, a
later opportunity for legislators to pray or meditate individually gave lit-
tle incremental benefit to religion.44 Finally, the court found the prayer
room would not engender administrative entanglements between religion
and the state.45
The court did, however, place a limit on the scope of its ruling. Their
36. 839 F.2d at 1218, 1220. The court stated: "Legislators are not immune from the strictures
of the establishment clause with respect even to their internal practices. But Marsh, the only author-
itative case treating these problems, departed entirely from the Lemon analysis." Id. at 1220.
37. Id. at 1219.
38. Id
39. Id. at 1220.
40. Id
41. Id at 1223.
42. Id. The district court reached the opposite conclusion in its application of the Lemon test.
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. Perhaps this different result is attributable to a "less-
than-vigorous" application by the Court of Appeals. See supra notes 23, 27 and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 1221.
44. Id. at 1222.
45. Id. at 1222-223. The court opined that one reason Marsh apparently created a special
branch of establishment clause jurisprudence was the unlikelihood of any significant entanglement




review examined only whether Illinois' H.R. 408, considered with the
administrative actions taken to date, violated the establishment clause.46
The court stated that the prayer room might violate the first amendment
if decorated or used in certain unspecified ways.47
The Van Zandt court took a logical step in extending the constitution-
ality of legislative prayers to legislative prayer rooms.48 The court prop-
erly relied on Marsh in examining an establishment clause challenge to a
legislature's internal religious practices.49 The Supreme Court's flexible
approach allowed the Court of Appeals to uphold a traditional interac-
tion between church and state that does not threaten to destroy the neu-
trality towards the separation between government and religion.50
Based on Marsh, the court did not need to consider the Lemon test.5
However, the court did not jeopardize its position by positing Lemon as a
fall back rationale.2 Additionally, by limiting its holding to the prayer
room, the Van Zandt decision acknowledges the traditional role of reli-
gion in American society 3 without endorsing radical extensions of
Marsh.
The court's decision in Van Zandt emphasizes the role of legislative
religious practices within the confines of the establishment clause. It
takes a small, carefully limited step in expanding the Marsh rationale and
case line. Van Zandt thus increases other courts' abilities to rely on
Marsh's historical perspective in evaluating establishment clause chal-
lenges to legislative practices, and perhaps to all legislation concerning
the relationship between church and state.
H.L.G.
46. Id. at 1218.
47. Id. at 1217-218. The court found that the intrusion of sectarian influences and religious
emphases could give rise to an establishment clause violation. Thus, further developments in the
decoration and use of the prayer room will not automatically or routinely pass constitutional muster.
Id. at 1224.
48, See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 24, 28-30 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 24, 28, 35 and accompanying text.
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